With the widespread use of LBSs (Location-based Services), synthesizing location traces plays an increasingly important role in analyzing spatial big data while protecting users' privacy. Although location synthesizers have been widely studied, existing synthesizers do not provide utility, privacy, or scalability sufficiently, hence are not practical for large-scale location traces. To overcome this issue, we propose a novel location synthesizer called PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Multiple Tensor Factorization). We model various statistical features of the original traces by a transitioncount tensor and a visit-count tensor. We simultaneously factorize these two tensors via multiple tensor factorization, and train factor matrices via posterior sampling. Then we synthesize traces from reconstructed tensors using the MH (Metropolis-Hastings) algorithm. We comprehensively evaluate the proposed method using two datasets. Our experimental results show that the proposed method preserves various statistical features, provides plausible deniability, and synthesizes large-scale location traces in practical time. The proposed method also significantly outperforms the state-ofthe-art with regard to the utility, privacy, and scalability.
INTRODUCTION
LBSs (Location-based Services) have been used in a variety of applications such as POI (Point-of-Interest) search, route finding, games, and geo-social networking. Consequently, a large amount of location traces (time-series location trails) have been collected into the LBS provider. The LBS provider can provide these location traces (also called spatial big data [63] ) to a third party (or data analyst) to perform various types of geo-data analysis tasks; e.g., finding popular POIs [79] , semantic annotation of POIs [20, 75] , modeling human mobility patterns [67, 43, 41, 18] , road map inference [42, 6] .
Although such geo-data analysis is important for industry and society, there are some serious privacy issues. For example, users' sensitive locations (e.g., homes, hospitals), profiles (e.g., age, profession) [46, 77, 35] , or social relationship [24, 7] can be estimated from traces. Robbers or stalkers [57, 70] might also exploit location data of victims. This kind of privacy is collectively called location privacy [39, 27, 58, 13] , and numerous studies have been made on this issue.
Synthesizing location traces [9, 65, 16, 34, 68, 76, 38, 28] is one of the most promising approaches to perform geo-data analysis while protecting users' privacy. This approach first trains some generative model from the original traces (referred to as training traces). Then it generates synthetic traces (or dummy traces) using the trained generative model. The synthetic traces preserve some statistical features (e.g., population distribution, transition matrix) of the original traces, as these features are modeled by the generative model. Thus, based on the synthetic traces, a data analyst can perform a variety of geo-data analysis tasks explained above. In addition, the synthetic traces are (ideally) designed to provide little information about the original traces, and hence protect users' privacy from a possibly malicious data analyst. Besides geo-data analysis, synthetic traces can also be used as a dataset for research [53, 32] or anonymization competition [2] .
Moreover, synthetic traces can be used for local obfuscation in LBSs. Specifically, a user (who does not trust even the LBS provider) can send synthetic traces as dummies along with her own trace to use an LBS (e.g., POI search, route finding). If the synthetic traces look to be actual traces, the adversary cannot find out which is the user's actual trace among the traces sent to the LBS provider. Since this approach also sends the true locations at the exact time (unlike adding noise, generalization, deleting locations [64] , and time obfuscation [59, 12] ), it does not degrade the service quality of the LBS (at the cost of some communication overhead).
Ideally, a location synthesizer should satisfy the following three features: (i) high utility: it synthesizes traces that preserve various statistical features of the original traces; (ii) high privacy: it provides little information about the original traces; (iii) high scalability: it generates a large amount of traces within an acceptable time; e.g., within days or weeks at most. All of these features are vitally necessary for spatial big data analysis or providing a large-scale synthetic dataset. They are also necessary for location obfuscation when the number of users is very large. Note that high utility is important in location obfuscation, because otherwise synthetic traces can be distinguished from real traces [9] .
Although many location synthesizers [9, 65, 16, 34, 68, 76, 38, 28] have been studied, none of them are satisfactory in terms of the three features, which we explain in detail below. Related work. Location privacy has been widely studied (see [39, 27, 58, 13] for surveys) with numerous LPPMs (Location-Privacy Protection Mechanisms); e.g., adding noise [5, 66, 49] , location generalization [64, 26, 15] , deleting locations [64, 72, 29] , time obfuscation [59, 12] , and synthesizing traces (adding dummies) [9, 65, 16, 34, 68, 76, 38, 28] . Synthesizing traces is promising in terms of geo-data analysis, providing a dataset, and location obfuscation, as explained above.
Although Location synthesizers have been widely studied for over a decade, Bindschaedler and Shokri [9] showed most of them do not satisfactorily preserve statistical features (especially, semantic features of human mobility, e.g., "many people spend night at home"), and do not provide high utility.
A synthetic location traces generator in [9] (denoted by SGLT) is a state-of-the-art location synthesizer. SGLT first trains semantic clusters, which group locations that are semantically similar (e.g., homes, offices, or malls) from training traces. Then it generates a synthetic trace from a training trace (called a seed trace) by replacing each location with all locations in the same cluster and then sampling a trace via the Viterbi algorithm. [9] showed that SGLT preserves semantic features explained above and hence provides high utility.
However, SGLT has an issue with scalability, which is essential for spatial big data analysis. Specifically, the running time of semantic clustering in SGLT is quadratic in the number of training users and cubic in the number of locations. Consequently, SGLT cannot be used for generating large-scale traces. For example, we show that when the numbers of users and locations are about 200000 and 1000, respectively, SGLT would require over four years even using 1000 nodes of a supercomputer in parallel. In addition, SGLT uses plausible deniability using a semantic distance between two traces (introduced in [9] ) as a privacy measure, and its relationship with DP (Differential Privacy) [21, 22] is unclear.
Bindschaedler et al. [10] proposed a synthetic data generator (denoted by SGD) for any kind of data using a dependency graph. However, SGD was not applied to location traces, and its effectiveness for traces was unclear. We apply SGD to location traces, and show that it does not provide high utility.
Our contributions. We design a location synthesizer with high utility, privacy, and scalability. Specifically, we propose a novel approach called PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Multiple Tensor Factorization). Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose PPMTF for synthesizing traces. PPMTF models statistical features of training traces by two tensors: a transition-count tensor, which contains a transition matrix for each user, and visit-count tensor, which represents a time-dependent population distribution. PPMTF simultaneously factorizes the two tensors via MTF (Multiple Tensor Factorization) [37, 69] and trains factor matrices (parameters in our generative model) via posterior sampling [71] to provide high utility and high privacy. To our knowledge, this work is the first to propose MTF in a privacy preserving way.
• We propose a method to synthesize traces from the trained parameters using the MH (Metropolis-Hastings) algorithm [51] to make the transition matrix consistent with the time-dependent population distribution.
• We comprehensively show that the proposed method (denoted by Proposal) provides high utility, privacy, and scalability (for details, see below).
For utility, we show Proposal significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art in terms of the following statistical features.
(a) Time-dependent population distribution. The population distribution (i.e., distribution of visited locations) can be used for various geo-data analysis such as finding popular POIs [79] and semantic annotation of POIs [20, 75] . It can also be used to provide a user with the number of current visitors at a specific POI [30] . Some of these tasks are also based on the fact that the population distribution is inherently time-dependent; e.g., [75] uses the population distribution for each hour as a feature; [30] considers a scenario where the number of current diners in a nearby restaurant is sent to the user. (b) Transition matrix. The transition matrix is a main feature for modeling human movement patterns, and is used for predicting the next POI [67] or recommending POIs [43] .
(c) Distribution of visit-fractions. For semantic annotation of POIs, a distribution of visit-fractions (or visit-counts) is a key feature. For example, [20] shows that many people spend about 60% of the time at home and about 20% of the time at work/school. [75] shows that most users visit a hotel once or twice, while they may visit a restaurant for multiple times.
(d) Cluster-specific population distribution. At an individual level, a location distribution is different from user to user, and forms some clusters; e.g., those who commute by car, and those who often visit malls. The population distribution for such a cluster can be used for modeling human location patterns [41] , road map inference [42, 6] , and smart cities [18] . We show that Proposal provides all of (a)-(d), whereas SGD does not consider user/cluster-specific features in a practical setting, and hence does not provide (c) nor (d).
We emphasize that (a)-(d) are important also for location obfuscation, because synthetic traces that do not preserve the statistical features can be distinguished from real traces [9] .
For a privacy measure, we use (k, ε)-PD (Plausible Deniability) in [10] , which has a connection with DP. We show that Proposal provides (k, ε)-PD for reasonable k and ε.
Regarding the scalability, for a larger number |U| of training users and a larger number |X | of locations, Proposal's time complexity O(|U||X | 2 ) is much smaller than SGLT's complexity O(|U | 2 |X | 3 ). [9] evaluated SGLT using training traces of only 30 users. In this paper, we use the Foursquare dataset in [73] (we use six cities; 448839 training users in total), and show Proposal generates the corresponding traces within 60 hours (about 10 6 times faster than SGLT), and can also deal with traces of a million users.
Note that Proposal does not outperform SGLT or SGD in all aspects; e.g., in our experiments, Proposal outperforms SGLT with respect to (a), but is worse than SGLT with respect to (b); SGD is more scalable than Proposal. However, our biggest advantage is that Proposal is the first to provide all of the utility ((a)-(d)), privacy, and scalability to our knowledge, which makes large-scale traces generation practical.
We also implemented Proposal with C++, and made it public [1] . The proposed method was also used as a part of the location synthesizer for anonymization competition [2] .
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
Let N, Z ≥0 , R, and R ≥0 be the set of natural numbers, non-negative integers, real numbers, and non-negative real numbers, respectively. For n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a finite set Z, let Z * be the set of all finite sequences of elements of Z. Let P(Z) be the power set of Z, and DZ be the set of all probability distributions over Z.
We discretize locations by dividing the whole map into distinct regions or extracting frequently visited POIs (Pointof-Interests). Let X be a finite set of discretized locations (i.e., regions or POIs), and xi ∈ X be the i-th location. We also discretize time into time instants (e.g., by partitioning it at a regular interval such as 20 minutes or 1 hour), and represent a time instant as a natural number. Let T ⊂ N be a finite set of time instants under consideration.
In addition to the time instant, we introduce a time slot as a time resolution in geo-data analysis; e.g., if we want to compute the time-dependent population distribution for every hour, then the length of each time slot is one hour. We represent a time slot as a set of time instants. Formally, let L ⊆ P(T ) be a finite set of time slots, and li ∈ L be the i-th time slot. In Figure 1 , l1 = {1, 2, 3}, l2 = {4, 5, 6}, l3 = {7, 8, 9}, and L = {l1, l2, l3}. The time slot can be composed of either one time instant or multiple time instants (as in Figure 1 ). The time slot can also be composed of separated time instants; e.g., if we set the interval between two time instants to 1 hour, and want to average the population distribution for every two hours over two days, then l1 = {1, 2, 25, 26}, · · · , l12 = {23, 24, 47, 48}, and L = {l1, · · · l12}.
Next we formally define the notion of traces as follows. We refer to a pair of a location and a time instant as an event, and denote the set of all events by E = X × T . Let U be a finite set of all training users, and un ∈ U be the n-th training user. Then we define each trace as a pair of a user and a finite sequence of events, and denote the set of all traces by R = U × E * . Each trace may be missing
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Hour (AM) 7 some events. Without loss of generality, we assume that each training user has provided a single training trace (if a user provides multiple temporally-separated traces, we can concatenate them into a single trace by regarding events between the traces as missing). Let S ⊆ R be the finite set of all training traces, and sn ∈ S be the n-th training trace (i.e., training trace of un). Figure 1 shows an example of training traces; e.g., s1 = (u1, (x2, 1), (x3, 2), (x4, 3), (x3, 5), (x4, 6), (x5, 7), (x5, 9)), S = {s1, s2, s3}. We can also deal with a situation in which a user is in multiple regions in the same interval between two time instants. For example, assume that user u4 visits x1 at 7:00, x2 at 7:10, and x2 at 7:20. If we set the length of each time interval to 20 minutes as in Figure 1 , then the training trace s4 of u4 can be expressed (by rounding down minutes to a multiple of 20) as follows: s4 = (u4, (x1, 1), (x2, 1), (x2, 2)).
We train parameters of a generative model (e.g., semantic clusters in [9] , MTF parameters in the proposed method) from training traces, and use the model to synthesize a trace. As with [9] , we assume that, given a user un's training trace sn, the trained generative model outputs a synthetic trace that resembles sn, while protecting the privacy of un. We denote by y ∈ R a synthetic trace, and by M : S → DR a probabilistic generative model that, given a training trace sn, outputs a synthetic trace y with probability p(y = M(sn)).
In Appendix A, we also show the basic notations in Table 2.
Privacy Measures
Here we introduce DP (Differential Privacy) [21, 22] and PD (Plausible Deniability) [9, 10] as privacy measures.
Differential Privacy. We define the notion of neighboring data sets in the same way as [22, 71, 44] as follows. Let S, S ⊆ R be two sets of training traces. We say S and S are neighboring if they differ from each other at most one trace and consist of the same number of traces, i.e., |S| = |S |. For example, given a trace s 1 ∈ R, S = {s1, s2, s3} in Figure 1 and S = {s 1 , s2, s3} are neighboring.
Then DP [21, 22] is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ε-DP and (ε, δ)-DP). Let ε, δ ∈ R ≥0 . A randomized algorithm F with domain P(R) provides (ε, δ)-DP if for any neighboring S, S ⊆ R and any Z ⊆ Range(F),
If δ = 0, we abbreviate (ε, δ)-DP as ε-DP.
Intuitively, ε-DP guarantees that an adversary who has observed the output of F cannot determine, for any pair of S and S , whether it comes from S or S (i.e., a particular user's trace is included in the training trace set) with a certain degree of confidence. As the privacy budget ε approaches to 0, S and S become almost equally likely, which means that a user's privacy is strongly protected. (ε, δ)-DP is a relaxation of ε-DP that allows for deviating from ε-DP with probability δ [22] .
Plausible Deniability. The notion of PD was originally introduced by Bindschaedler and Shokri [9] to quantify how well a trace y ∈ R synthesized from a generative model M provides privacy for the input training trace. However, PD in [9] was defined using a semantic distance between traces, and its relationship with DP was unclear. Later, Bindschaedler et al. [10] modified PD to clarify the relationship between PD and DP. In this paper, we use the definition of PD in [10] : 
Note that [10] 
Intuitively, (k, ε)-PD in Definition 2 guarantees that the input training trace s d 1 ∈ S is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other training traces s d 2 , · · · , s d k ∈ S among all of the training traces. Note that (k, ε)-PD is totally different from k-anonymity, as discussed in [9, 10] . k-anonymity is vulnerable to attribute inference [45] or location inference [64] by an adversary with some background knowledge, whereas (k, ε)-PD does not depend on the background knowledge of the adversary, as with DP [10] .
PD is a privacy measure for an adversary who obtains synthetic traces, whereas the parameters of the generative model M might also leak some information about the training trace set S. However, it should be noted that this can be prevented by keeping secret the parameters of M (or discarding the parameters after synthesizing traces). In fact, a location synthesizer in [9] outputs only synthetic traces, and does not output the parameters of M (i.e., semantic clusters) computed from S. Similarly, we consider a location synthesizer that outputs only synthetic traces and keeps secret the parameters of M (or discarding them after synthesizing traces).
PRIVACY-PRESERVING MULTIPLE TEN-SOR FACTORIZATION (PPMTF)
We propose PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Multiple Tensor Factorization) for synthesizing location traces. We first describe its overview (Section 3.1). We then explain the computation of two tensors from training traces (Section 3.2), the training of MTF parameters from the two tensors (Section 3.3), and the synthesis of traces from the MTF parameters (Section 3.4). We finally prove the DP (Differential Privacy) of PPMTF, and introduce the PD (Plausible Deniability) test (Section 3.5). 
Overview
Proposed method. Figure 2 shows the overview of the proposed method. It is composed of the following five steps.
(i). We compute a transition-count tensor and visit-count tensor from a training trace set S (Sections 3.2).
The transition-count tensor is composed of the "User," "Location," and "Next Location" modes, and its (n, i, j)th element contains a transition-count of user un ∈ U from location xi ∈ X to xj ∈ X . In other words, this tensor represents the movement pattern of each training user in the form of transition-counts.
The visit-count tensor is composed of the "User," "Location," and "Time Slot" modes, and the (n, i, j)-th element contains a visit-count of user un at location xi in time slot lj ∈ L. In other words, this tensor contains a histogram of visited locations for each user and each time slot.
(ii). We share the "User" and "Location" modes between the two tensors, and perform MTF (Multiple Tensor Factorization) [37, 69] for the two tensors. For a tensor factorization model, we use the CP decomposition [17] in the same way as [37, 69] . The CP decomposition factorizes a tensor into low-rank matrices called factor matrices along each mode. Since we share the "User" and "Location" modes, we factorize the two tensors into four factor matrices as in Figure 2 Formally, let z ∈ N be the number of columns (factors) in each matrix, and A ∈ R |U |×z , B ∈ R |X |×z , C ∈ R |X |×z , and D ∈ R |L|×z be the factor matrices, which correspond to the "User," "Location," "Next Location," and "Time Slot" mode, respectively. A, B, C, and D are the MTF parameters. Typically, the number of columns is much smaller than the numbers of users and locations; i.e., z min(|U |, |X |). In our experiments, we set z = 16 as in [50] . Let Θ = (A, B, C, D) be the tuple of MTF parameters. We train MTF parameters Θ from the two tensors via posterior sampling [71] . The MTF parameters are used as parameters of our generative model.
(iii). Given a training trace sn ∈ S, we compute a transitionprobability matrix and visit-probability vector of the corresponding user un ∈ U for each time slot. We compute them from the MTF parameters Θ via the MH (Metropolis-Hastings) algorithm [51] (Section 3.4).
(iv). We generate a synthetic trace y ∈ R that resembles the training trace sn of user un (Section 3.4).
(v). We finally perform the PD test, which verifies whether y is releasable with (k, ε)-PD (Section 3.5).
The main advantages of the proposed method are high utility, privacy, and scalability. Utility. First, the proposed method achieves high utility by modeling statistical features of training traces using two tensors. Specifically, the transition-count tensor represents the movement pattern of each user in the form of transitioncounts, whereas the visit-count tensor contains a histogram of visited locations for each user and time slot. Consequently, our synthetic traces preserve statistical features, e.g., a transition matrix, a time-dependent population distribution, and a distribution of visit-counts per location. These are key features for various geo-data analyses, e.g., modeling human movement patterns [67, 43] or location patterns [41, 18] , finding popular POIs [79] , and semantic annotation of POIs [20, 75] .
Furthermore, the proposed method automatically finds users who have similar behavior (e.g., those who always stay in Manhattan; those who often visit universities) and locations that are semantically similar (e.g., restaurants and bars), as factor matrices in tensor factorization represent clusters [17] (see [50, 69] for examples of location data). Consequently, our synthetic traces preserve the mobility behavior of similar users and the semantics of similar locations. They are also useful for various geo-data analysis (e.g., modeling human location or movement patterns, road map inference [42, 6] , semantic annotation of POIs). In Section 4, we visualize how well similar users and similar locations are clustered.
The proposed method also addresses the sparseness of the tensors by sharing factor matrices A and B. In Appendix D, we show that the utility is improved by sharing A and B. Privacy. Second, the proposed method achieves high privacy by training the MTF parameters via posterior sampling. As shown in [71] , posterior sampling-based Bayesian learning algorithms provide DP "for free" (without additional noise) by producing a sample from a posterior distribution given a dataset. We utilize this fact, and sample the MTF parameters from a posterior distribution given a training trace set S.
A major issue in differentially private matrix/tensor factorization is that the privacy budget ε can be very large in practice. This follows from the fact that ε increases with increase in the number of observed elements per user, and with increase in the maximum value of elements. For example, Liu et al. [44] applied posterior sampling to matrix factorization, and reported that it needs ε = 250 to achieve high utility. It is important to note, however, that DP guarantees Visit-count tensor II Time Slot indistinguishability for all possible users including the one whose elements are completely different from normal users; e.g., a malicious user who provides a value completely opposite from what the model would predict for all elements, as pointed out in [44] . Obviously, it is not necessary for the input training trace to be indistinguishable from such anomaly traces. Thus we use PD as a privacy measure in the same way as [9, 10] . In other words, we guarantee that the input training trace is indistinguishable from some traces that would appear in practice. In our experiments, we show that the proposed method provides (k, ε)-PD for reasonable k and ε.
Scalability. Finally, the proposed method achieves much higher scalability than the location synthesizer in [9] . Specifically, the time complexity of [9] (semantic clustering) is O(|U| 2 |X | 3 |L|), which is very large for training traces with large |U| and |X |. On the other hand, the time complexity of the proposed method is O(|U||X | 2 ||L|), which is much smaller than the synthesizer in [9] (see Appendix B for details). In our experiments, we evaluate the running time of the proposed method and the synthesizer in [9] , and show that our method can be applied to much larger-scale training datasets.
Computation of Two Tensors
We now explain how to compute two tensors from a training trace set S (i.e., step (i)) in detail.
Two tensors. Figure 3 shows an example of the two tensors computed from the training traces in Figure 1 .
The transition-count tensor contains a transition-count matrix for each user. Let R I ∈ Z
|U |×|X |×|X | ≥0
be the transitioncount tensor, and r I n,i,j ∈ Z ≥0 be its (n, i, j)-th element. For example, r I 1,3,4 = 2 in Figure 3 , since two transitions from x3 to x4 are observed in the training trace s1 of u1 in Figure 1 .
The visit-count tensor contains a histogram of visited locations for each user and each time slot. Let R II ∈ Z |U |×|X |×|L| ≥0 be the visit-count tensor, and r II n,i,j ∈ Z ≥0 be its (n, i, j)-th element. For example, r II 1,5,3 = 2 in Figure 3 , as u1 visits x5 twice in l3 (i.e., from time instant 7 to 9) in Figure 1 .
Let R = (R I , R II ). Typically, R I and R II are sparse; i.e., many elements are zeros In particular, R I can be extremely sparse for large |X |, as its size |R I | is quadratic in |X |.
Trimming. For both tensors, we randomly delete positive elements of users who have provided much more positive elements than the average (i.e., outliers) in the same way as [44] . This is called trimming, and is effective for matrix completion [36] . It is also necessary to provide DP [44]. Similarly, we also set the maximum value of counts for each element, and truncate counts that exceed the maximum number. Specifically, let λ I , λ II ∈ N be the maximum numbers of positive elements per user in R I and R II , respectively. Typically, λ I |X | × |X | and λ II |X | × |L|. For each user, if the number of positive elements in R I exceeds λ I , then we randomly select λ I elements from all positive elements, and delete the remaining positive elements. Similarly, we randomly delete extra positive elements in λ II . In addition, let r I max , r II max ∈ N be the maximum counts for each element in R I and R II , respectively. For each element, we trun-
In our experiments, we set λ I = λ II = 10 2 (as in [44] ), and r I max = r II max = 10, since the number of positive elements per user and the value of counts were less than 100 and 10, respectively, in most cases.
Training MTF Parameters via Posterior Sampling
After computing the tensors R = (R I , R II ), we train the MTF parameters Θ = (A, B, C, D) via posterior sampling (i.e., step (ii)). Below we describe our MTF model and the training.
Model. Let a i,k , b i,k , c i,k , d i,k ∈ R be the (i, k)-th elements of A, B, C, and D, respectively. In addition, letR I ∈ R |U |×|X |×|X | andR II ∈ R |U |×|X |×|L| be the approximation of R I and R II by the proposed method, respectively, and r I n,i,j ∈ R andr II n,i,j ∈ R be their (n, i, j)-th elements. Then R I andR II are given by:
where the matrices A and B are shared between R I and R II . For MTF parameters Θ, we assume a hierarchical Bayes model [61] , since it outperforms the non-hierarchical one [60] in terms of the model's predictive accuracy. Figure 4 shows a graphical model of the proposed method. For the conditional distribution p(R|Θ) of the two tensors R = (R I , R II ) given the MTF parameters Θ = (A, B, C, D), we assume that each element r I n,i,j (resp. r II n,i,j ) is independently generated from a normal distribution with meanr I n,i,j (resp.r II n,i,j ) and precision α ∈ R ≥0 (ranging over [0.5, 1000] in our experiments later).
Here it is important to note that each element in R contains a transition/visit count, and such a count is called implicit feedback [3, 31] (e.g., purchasing quantities in item recommendation). Unlike the explicit feedback dataset that contains negative values (e.g., integer ratings in [−2, 2]), zero elements in the implicit feedback dataset should be treated as 0s rather than missing elements to avoid overfitting [3] . However, the treatment of all zero elements as 0s results in a high computational cost, especially for large tensors.
We overcome the computational issue by randomly sampling a small number of zero elements and treating them as 0s [3, 54] . Specifically, we randomly sample ρ I ∈ N and ρ II ∈ N zero elements for each user in R I and R II , respectively, where ρ I |X | × |X | and ρ II |X | × |L| (in our experiments, we set ρ I = ρ II = 10 3 ). We treat the sampled zero elements as 0s, and the remaining zero elements as missing. Let I I n,i,j (resp. I II n,i,j ) be the indicator function that takes 0 if r I n,i,j (resp. r II n,i,j ) is missing, and takes 1 otherwise. Note that I I n,i,j (resp. I II n,i,j ) takes 1 at most λ I + ρ I (resp. λ II + ρ II ) elements for each user, where λ I (resp. λ II ) is the maximum number of positive elements per user in R I (resp. R II ).
Then the distribution p(R|Θ) can be written as follows:
where N (r|µ, α −1 ) denotes the probability of r in the normal distribution with mean µ and precision α (i.e., variance α −1 ). Let ai, bi, ci, di ∈ R z be the i-th rows of A, B, C, and D, respectively. Then, for the distribution of Θ = (A, B, C, D), we assume the multivariate normal distribution:
The hierarchical Bayes model assumes some distribution for the hyper-parameters. We assume each hyper-parameter Z ∈ {A, B, C, D} follows a normal-Wishart distribution [11] , i.e., the conjugate prior of a multivariate normal distribution:
where µ0 ∈ R z , β0 ∈ R, and W(Λ|W0, ν0) denotes the probability of Λ ∈ R z×z in the Wishart distribution with parameters W0 ∈ R z×z and ν0 ∈ R. (W0 and ν0 are a scale matrix and the number of degrees of freedom, respectively). µ0, β0, W0, and ν0 are called hyper-hyper-parameters, and are determined in advance. In our experiments, we set µ0 = 0, β0 = 2, W0 to the identity matrix, and ν0 = z in the same way as [61] .
Posterior sampling of Θ. We train the MTF parameters Θ based on the posterior sampling method [71] . This method trains Θ from R by sampling Θ from the posterior distribution p(Θ|R). To sample Θ from p(Θ|R), we use the Gibbs sampling [51] , which samples each variable in turn, conditioned on the current values of the other variables. Figure 5 : Computation of (Qn,i, πn,i) via MH. We compute Q * n fromR I n , and πn,i fromR II n . Then for each time slot li ∈ L, we modify Q * n to Qn,i whose stationary distribution is πn,i.
Specifically, we sample Ψ A , Ψ B , Ψ C , Ψ D , A, B, C, and D in turn. We add the superscript "(t)" to these variables to denote the sampled values at the t-th iteration. For initial values with "(0)", we use a random initialization method [4] that initializes each element as a random number in [0, 1], as it is widely used. Then, we sample Ψ
, and D (t) from the conditional distribution given the current values of the other variables, and iterate the sampling for a fixed number of times (see Appendix G for details).
The Gibbs sampling guarantees that the sampling distributions of A (t) , · · · , D (t) approach to the posterior distributions p(A|R), · · · , p(D|R) as t increases, and hence
) approximates Θ sampled from the posterior distribution p(Θ|R) for large t. In our experiments, we discarded the first 99 samples as "burn-in", and used Θ (100) as an approximation of Θ. We also confirmed that the model's predictive accuracy was converged within 100 iterations.
Generating Traces via MH
After training the MTF parameters Θ from the tensors R, we generate synthetic traces via the MH (Metropolis-Hastings) algorithm [51] (i.e., steps (iii) and (iv)). Here we explain how to, given a training trace sn ∈ S, generate a synthetic trace y ∈ R that resembles sn of user un ∈ U .
Let Q be the set of |X | × |X | transition-probability matrices, and C be the set of |X |-dimensional probability vectors (i.e., probability simplex). Given a transition-probability matrix Q ∈ Q and a probability vector π ∈ C, the MH algorithm modifies Q to Q ∈ Q so that the stationary distribution of Q is equal to π. Note that Q is a conditional distribution called a proposal distribution, and π is called a target distribution.
In the step (iii), given sn, we reconstruct the transitioncount matrix and visit-count matrix of user un (note that un is included in sn), and use the MH algorithm to make a transition-probability matrix of un consistent with a visitprobability vector of un for each time slot. Figure 5 shows its overview. Specifically, letR I n ∈ R |X |×|X | andR II n ∈ R |X |×|L| be the n-th matrices inR I andR II , respectively (i.e., reconstructed transition-count matrix and visit-count matrix of user un). We first computeR I n andR II n from Θ by (3). Then we compute a transition-probability matrix Q * n ∈ Q of user un fromR I n by normalizing counts to probabilities. Similarly, we compute a visit-probability vector πn,i ∈ C of user un for each time slot li ∈ L fromR II n by normalizing counts to probabilities. Then, for each time slot li ∈ L, Figure 6 : Generation of a synthetic trace (|X | = 5, |T | = 9, |L| = 3). The gray arrow represents that a location is randomly generated from a distribution in the same time slot.
we modify Q * n to Qn,i ∈ Q via the MH algorithm so that the stationary distribution of Qn,i is equal to πn,i. In the subsequent step (iv), we generate a synthetic trace using (Qn,i, πn,i).
Below we explain the steps (iii) and (iv) in more detail.
Computing (Qn,i, πn,i) via MH. We first compute the n-th matrixR I n ∈ R |X |×|X | inR I from Θ by (3), and then compute Q * n ∈ Q fromR I n by normalizing counts to probabilities as follows. We assign a very small positive value δ (δ = 10 −8 in our experiments) to elements inR I n whose values are smaller than δ, and then normalizeR I n to Q * n so that the sum over each row in Q * n is 1. Since we assign δ (= 10 −8 ) to elements with smaller values inR I n , the transition-probability matrix Q * n is regular [51] ; i.e., it is possible to get from any location to any location in one step. This allows πn,i to be the stationary distribution of Qn,i, as explained later in detail.
We then compute the n-th matrixR II n ∈ R |X |×|L| inR II from Θ by (3) . For each time slot li ∈ L, we assign δ (= 10 −8 ) to elements with smaller values inR II n , and then normalize the i-th column ofR II n to πn,i ∈ C so that the sum of πn,i is one.
We use Q * n as a proposal distribution and πn,i as a target distribution, and apply the MH algorithm to obtain a transition-probability matrix Qn,i whose stationary distribution is πn,i. For Q ∈ Q and a, b ∈ [|X |], we denote by Q(x b |xa) ∈ [0, 1] the transition probability from xa ∈ X to x b ∈ X (i.e., the (a, b)-th element of Q). Similarly, given π ∈ C, we denote by π(xa) ∈ [0, 1] the visit probability at xa ∈ X . Then, the MH algorithm computes Qn,i(x b |xa) for xa = x b as follows: (6) and computes Qn,i(xa|xa) as follows: Qn,i(xa|xa) = 1 − b =a Qn,i(x b |xa). Note that Qn,i is regular, as all elements in Q * n and πn,i are positive. Then the MH algorithm guarantees that πn,i is a stationary distribution of Qn,i [51] .
Generating traces. After computing (Qn,i, πn,i) via the MH algorithm, we synthesize a trace y ∈ R of user un as follows. We first randomly generate the first location in time slot l1 from the visit-probability distribution πn,1. Then we randomly generate the subsequent location in time slot li using the transition-probability matrix Qn,i. Figure 6 shows an example of synthesizing a trace y of user un. In this example, a location at time instant 7 is randomly generated from the conditional distribution Qn,3 given the location x2 at time instant 6.
The synthetic trace y is generated in such a way that a visit probability in time slot li is given by πn,i. In addition, the transition matrix is computed by using Q * n as a proposal distribution. Therefore, we can synthesize traces that preserve the statistical feature of training traces such as the time-dependent population distribution and the transition matrix.
Privacy Protection
Here we prove the DP of PPMTF, and describe the PD test. DP of PPMTF. Since we train the MTF parameters Θ via posterior sampling, the training algorithm provides DP for free (without additional noise).
Specifically, let FPPMTF be our training algorithm in the step (ii), which takes as input the training trace set S and outputs the MTF parameters Θ. Recall that the maximum counts in R I and R II are r I max and r II max , respectively, as defined in Section 3.2. Let κ ∈ R ≥0 satisfy thatr I n,i,j ∈ [−κ, r I max + κ] andr II n,i,j ∈ [−κ, r II max + κ] for each n, i, j. κ can be made small by iterating the sampling of Θ until we find Θ with small κ [44] . In addition, assume that Θ is sampled from the exact posterior distribution p(Θ|R). Then we obtain:
See Appendix F for the proof. Since a trace y is synthesized from Θ after FPPMTF outputs Θ, all synthetic traces provide ε-DP thanks to the immunity to post-processing [22] .
However, ε can be very large in practice. Both the number of observed elements per user and the maximum value of elements with increase in the length of the training traces. For example, we set α ≥ 0.5, λ I = λ II = 10 2 , ρ I = ρ II = 10 3 , and r I max = r II max = 10 in our experiments, and consequently ε is larger than 10 5 . We emphasize again that DP guarantees that the input training trace is indistinguishable from all possible traces including anomaly traces. Thus we use PD as a privacy measure, and perform the PD test as follows. PD test. We perform the PD test to guarantee (k, ε)-PD in Definition 2 for synthetic traces.
Let MPPMTF : S → DR be our generative model in the steps (iii) and (iv), which maps a training trace sn ∈ S to a synthetic trace y ∈ R with probability p(y = MPPMTF(sn)). Let σ : T → X be a function that, given time instant t ∈ T , outputs an index of the location at time instant t in y; e.g., σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 2, · · · , σ(9) = 5 in Figure 6 . Furthermore, let ω : T → L be a function that, given time instant t ∈ T , outputs an index of the corresponding time slot; e.g., ω(1) = ω(2) = ω(3) = 1, · · · , ω(7) = ω(8) = ω(9) = 3 in Figure 6 .
Recall that the first location in y is randomly generated from πn,1, and the subsequent location at time instant t ∈ T is randomly generated from Q n,ω(t) . Thus we obtain:
Hence, given y ∈ R, we can compute p(y = MPPMTF(sm)) for any sm ∈ S as follows: (i) compute (Qm,i, πm,i) for each time slot li ∈ L via the MH algorithm (as described in Section 3.4); (ii) compute p(y = MPPMTF(sm)). Then, we can verify whether y is releasable with (k, ε)-PD by counting the number of training traces such that (2) holds for each other.
For example, we can perform the following PD test in [10] :
Privacy Test 1 (Deterministic Test in [10] ). Let k ∈ N and ε ∈ R ≥0 . Given a training trace set S, input training trace sn, and synthetic trace y, output pass or fail as follows:
1. Let i ∈ Z ≥0 be a non-negative integer that satisfies:
2. Let k ∈ Z ≥0 be the number of traces sm ∈ S such that:
3. If k ≥ k, then return pass, otherwise return fail.
It is easy to check by (2), (7) , and (8) that if y passes Privacy Test 1, then y is releasable with (k, ε)-PD. In addition, (k, ε)-PD is guaranteed even if Θ is not sampled from the exact posterior distribution p(Θ|R) (unlike ε-DP). The time complexity of Privacy Test 1 is linear in |U |.
In this paper, we randomly select a subset S * ⊆ S of training traces from S (as in [10] ) to check faster whether k ≥ k or not. Specifically, we initialize k to 0, and check (8) for each training trace in S * ∪ {sn} (increment k if (8) holds). If k ≥ k, then we return pass (otherwise, return fail). Let U * ⊆ U be the set of training users corresponding to S * . Then the time complexity of this faster version of Privacy Test 1 is linear in |U * | (≤ |U|). A lower value of |U * | leads to a faster (k, ε)-PD test at the expense of fewer synthetic traces passing the test (and hence the loss of utility). In Section 4, we use the faster version of Privacy Test 1 with |U * | = 32000, k = 10, and ε = 1 (note that ε = 1 is considered to be reasonable in DP [23, 40] ). In Appendix E, we also analyze the effect of k on the performance of the proposed method, and show that the proposed method achieves high utility for large-scale traces even when k is much larger than 10; e.g., k = 100 or 200.
We can also use a randomized test [10] , which adds Laplacian noise to k, to provide (ε, δ)-DP for a single synthetic trace y generated from a randomly selected input training trace sn. However, ε and δ can be large for multiple synthetic traces from the same input training trace (as discussed in [10] ). Thus we did not use the randomized test in our experiments.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted experiments to show the utility, privacy, and scalability of the proposed method.
In our experiments, we used two publicly available datasets: the SNS-based people flow data [53] and the Foursquare dataset in [73] . The former is a relatively small-scale dataset with no missing events, and is used for comparing the proposed method with two state-of-the-art synthesizers [9, 10] . The latter is recently published, and is one of the largest publicly available location datasets; e.g., much larger than [74, 14, 78, 56] . Since the location synthesizer in [9] cannot be applied to this large-scale dataset (as shown in Section 4.4), we compare the proposed method with the synthesizer in [10] .
Datasets
SNS-based People Flow Data. The SNS-based people flow data [53] (denoted by PF) contains artificial traces around the Tokyo metropolitan area. The traces were generated from real geo-tagged tweets by interpolating locations every five minutes using railway and road information [62] .
In our experiments, we divided the Tokyo metropolitan area into 20 × 20 regions; i.e., |X | = 400. Then we set the interval between two time instants to 20 minutes, and extracted traces from 9:00 to 19:00 for 1000 users (each user has a single trace comprising 30 events). We also set time slots to 20 minutes long from 9:00 to 19:00. In other words, we assumed that each time slot is composed of one time instant; i.e., |L| = 30. We randomly divided the 1000 traces into 500 train traces and 500 testing traces; i.e., |U| = 500. The training traces were used for training generative models and synthesizing traces, whereas the testing traces were used for evaluating the utility.
Since the number of users is small in PF, we generated ten synthetic traces from each training trace (each synthetic trace is from 9:00 to 19:00) and averaged the utility and privacy results over the ten traces to stabilize the performance. Foursquare Dataset. The Foursquare dataset (Globalscale Check-in Dataset with User Social Networks) [73] (denoted by FS) is a large-scale real location dataset, which contains 90048627 check-ins by 2733324 users all over the world.
In our experiments, we selected six cities with a large number of check-ins and with a cultural diversity in the same way as [73] : Istanbul (IST), Jakarta (JK), New York City (NYC), Kuala Lumpur (KL), San Paulo (SP), and Tokyo (TKY). For each city, we extracted the most popular 1000 POIs, whose number of visits from all users was the largest; i.e., |X | = 1000. We set the interval between two time instants to 1 hour (we rounded down minutes), and assigned every 2 hours into one of 12 time slots l1 (0-2h), · · · , l12 (22-24h) in a cyclic manner; i.e., |L| = 12. For each city, we randomly selected 80% of traces as training traces and used the remaining traces as testing traces. The numbers |U | of users in IST, JK, NYC, KL, SP, and TKY were 219793, 83325, 52432, 51189, 42100, and 32056, respectively. Note that there were many missing events in FS, as FS is a location check-in dataset. The numbers of transitions (temporally-continuous events) in the training traces of IST, JK, NYC, KL, SP, and TKY were 109027, 19592, 7471, 25563, 13151, and 47956, respectively.
In FS, we generated one synthetic trace for one day from each training trace, and evaluated the utility and privacy.
Location Synthesizers
We evaluated the proposed method (Proposal), the synthetic location traces generator in [9] (SGLT), and the synthetic data generator in [10] (SGD).
In Proposal, we set the parameters z = 16, λ I = λ II = 10 2 , ρ I = ρ II = 10 3 , and r I max = r II max = 10, as explained in Section 3. For the hyper-hyper parameters, we set µ0 = 0, β0 = 2, W0 to the identity matrix, and ν0 = z (as in [61] ). Then we set the precision α to various values from 0.5 to 1000, and evaluated the utility and privacy for each value. We implemented Proposal with C++, and made it public [1] .
In SGLT [9] , we used the SGLT tool (C++) in [8] . We set the location-removal probability parc to 0.25, the location merging probability parm to 0.75, and the randomization multiplication factor parv to 4 in the same way as [9] (for details of the parameters in SGLT, see [9] ). For the number c of semantic clusters, we attempted various values: c = 50, 100, 150, or 200 (as shown later, SGLT provided the best performance when c = 50 or 100). For each case, we set the probability par l of removing the true location in the input training trace to various values from 0 to 1 (par l = 1 in [9] ) to evaluate the trade-off between the utility and privacy.
In SGD [10] , we trained the transition matrix for each time slot (|L| × |X | × |X | elements in total) and the visitprobability vector for the first time instant (|X | elements in total) from the training traces via maximum likelihood estimation. Note that the transition matrix and the visitprobability vector are common to all users. Then we generated a synthetic trace from an input training trace by copying the first γ ∈ Z ≥0 events and generating the remaining events using the trained transition matrix. When γ = 0, we randomly generated a location at the first time instant using the visit-probability vector. For more details of SGD, see Appendix C. We implemented SGD for location traces with C++, and made it public [1] .
Performance Measures
Utility. We evaluated the utility listed in Section 1 as follows.
(a) Time-dependent population distribution. We first computed a frequency distribution (|X |-dimensional vector) of the testing traces and that of the synthetic traces for each time slot. Then we evaluated the average total variation between the two distributions over all time slots (denoted by TP-TV).
Note that frequently visited locations are especially important for some tasks [79, 20] . Thus for each time slot, we also selected the top 50 locations, whose frequencies in the testing traces were the largest, and regarded the absolute error for the remaining locations in TP-TV as 0 (TP-TV-Top50).
(b) Transition matrix. We computed an average transitionprobability matrix (|X | × |X | matrix) over all users and all time instances from the testing traces. Similarly, we computed an average transition-probability matrix from the synthetic traces. Since each row of the transition-probability matrix represents a conditional distribution, we evaluated the EMD (Earth Mover's Distance) between the two conditional distributions over the x-axis (longitude) and y-axis (latitude), and averaged it over all rows (TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y). TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y represent how the two transition matrices differ over the x-axis and y-axis, respectively.
(c) Distribution of visit-fractions. Since we used POIs in FS (regions in PF), we evaluated how well the synthetic traces preserve a distribution of visit-fractions in FS. We first excluded testing traces that have a small number of events (less than 5). Then, for each of the remaining traces, we computed a fraction of visits for each POI. Based on this, we computed a distribution of visit-fractions for each POI by dividing the fraction into 24 bins as follows: (0, 1 24 ], ( 1 24 , 2 24 ], · · · , ( 23 24 , 1). Similarly, we computed a distribution of visit-fractions for each POI from the synthetic traces. Finally, we evaluated the total variation between the two distributions (VF-TV).
(d) Cluster-specific population distribution. To show that Proposal is also effective in this aspect, we performed the following analysis. We used the fact that each column in the factor matrix A represents a cluster (z = 16 clusters in total). Specifically, for each column in A, we extracted the top 10% users whose values in the column are the largest. These users form a cluster who exhibit a similar behavior.
We computed, for each cluster, the frequency distribution of the training traces (averaged over all time slots), and that of the synthetic traces. Then we computed the maximum total variation between the two distributions over all clusters (CP-TV). Moreover, we visualized the distributions and factor matrices for some clusters.
Privacy. In PF, we evaluated the three synthesizers. Although Proposal and SGD provide (k, ε)-PD in Definition 2, SGLT are designed to provide PD using a semantic distance between traces [9] , which is different from PD in Definition 2.
To compare the three synthesizers using the same privacy measure, we used the re-identification rate by the Bayesian adversary [48] . Specifically, we considered an adversary who identifies, for each synthetic trace, an input user, whose training trace is used to synthesize the trace, from |U| training users. We first trained the transition matrix for each training user from the training traces via maximum likelihood estimation. Then we re-identified each synthetic trace by selecting a training user whose posterior probability of being the input user is the highest (we computed the posterior probability by using the transition matrix and assuming a uniform prior; see [48] for details). We evaluated the re-identification rate as the proportion of synthetic traces correctly identified. In other words, we evaluate the concrete privacy leakage in terms of the number of users at a risk of exposure analogously to [33] . Using this measure, we show that Proposal achieves high privacy while keeping high utility.
In FS, we used (k, ε)-PD in Definition 2 as a privacy measure, since we evaluated only Proposal and SGD. As a PD test, we used the (faster) Privacy Test 1 with |U * | = 32000, k = 10, and ε = 1, as described in Section 3.5.
Scalability. We measured the time to synthesize traces using the ABCI (AI Bridging Cloud Infrastructure) [52] , which is a supercomputer ranking 8th in the Top 500 and 3rd in the Green 500 (as of June 2019). We used one computing node, which consists of two Intel Xeon Gold 6148 (27.5M Cache, 2.40 GHz, 20 Core) and 384GiB main memory.
Experimental Results in PF
Utility and privacy. Figure 7 shows the re-identification rate and utility with regard to (a) the time-dependent population distribution and (b) transition matrix in PF. Here, Uniform represents the utility when the uniform distribution is used as a distribution (i.e., the population distribution, each row of the transition matrix) of the synthetic traces. Training represents the utility of the training traces; i.e., the utility when we output the training traces as synthetic traces without modification. Ideally, the utility of the synthetic traces should be much better than that of Uniform and close to that of Training.
It can be seen from Figure 7 that Proposal achieves TP-TV and TP-TV-Top50 close to Training for a small reidentification rate. For example, when the re-identification rate is required to be less than 0.02, Proposal achieves TP-TV= 0.43 and TP-TV-Top50 = 0.13, both of which are close to those of Training (TP-TV= 0.39 and TP-TV-Top50 = 0.12). In SGLT and SGD, the re-identification rate rapidly increases with decrease in TP-TV and TP-TV-Top50. This is because both SGLT and SGD synthesize traces by copying over some events from the training traces. Specifically, SGLT (resp. SGD) increases the number of copied events by decreasing par l (resp. increasing γ). Although a larger number of copied events result in the decrease of both TP-TV and TP-TV-Top50, they also result in the rapid increase of the re-identification rate. This is consistent with the uniqueness of location data; e.g., only two (resp. three) locations are enough to uniquely characterize 50% (resp. 80%) of the individuals among one and a half million people [19] . It can also be seen that Proposal performs worse than SGLT and SGD with regard to TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y. We consider this is because Proposal modifies the transition matrix so that it is consistent with a visitprobability vector for each time slot using the MH algorithm (whereas SGLT and SGD do not modify the transition matrix). It should be noted, however, that Proposal significantly outperforms Uniform with regard to TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y, which means that Proposal preserves the transition matrix well.
Next, we show the utility with regard to (d) the clusterspecific population distribution. Table 1 shows CP-TV when the re-identification rate is less than 0.02. It can be seen that Proposal achieves the lowest CP-TV. To explain the reason for this, we performed the following analysis.
Analysis on cluster-specific features. We visualize in Figure 8 the frequency distributions of training traces and synthetic traces and the columns of factor matrices B and C for three clusters (we set α = 200, as it provided almost the best utility in Figure 7 ; we also normalized elements in each column of B and C so that the square-sum is one).
Recall that for each cluster, we extracted the top 10% users; i.e., 50 users. It can be seen that the frequency distributions of training traces are different from cluster to cluster, and the users in each cluster exhibit a similar behavior; e.g., the users in (i) stay in the northeastern area of Tokyo, whereas the users in (ii) and (iii) often use the subways. Proposal models such a cluster-specific behavior via B and C, and synthesizes traces that preserve the behavior using B and C. This explains the reason for a low value of CP-TV in Proposal. Figure 8 also shows that Proposal is useful for geo-data analysis such as modeling human location patterns [41] and map inference [42, 6] .
Scalability. We also measured the time to synthesize traces from training traces. Here we generated one synthetic trace from each training trace (500 synthetic traces in total), and measured the time. We also changed the numbers of users and locations (i.e., |U|, |X |) for various values from 100 to 1000 to see how the running time depends on |U| and |X |. Figure 9 shows the results (we set α = 200 in Proposal, and c = 100 and par l = 1 in SGLT; we also obtained almost the same results for other values). Here we excluded the running time of SGD, since it was very small; e.g., less than one second when |U| = 1000 and |X | = 400 (we compare the running time of Proposal with that of SGD in FS, as shown later). It can be seen that the running time of SGLT is much larger than that of Proposal. Specifically, the running time of SGLT is quadratic in |U| (e.g., when |X | = 400, SGLT(T) requires 0.47 and 47 hours for |U | = 100 and 1000, respectively) and cubic in |X | (e.g., when |U| = 100, SGLT(T) requires 8.1 × 10 −3 and 8.4 hours for |X | = 100 and 1000, respectively). On the other hand, the running time of Proposal is linear in |U| (e.g., Proposal(S) requires 6.3 × 10 −5 and 5.9 × 10 −4 hours for |U| = 100 and 1000, respectively) and quadratic in |X | (e.g., Proposal(S) requires 9.3 × 10 −3 and 0.96 hours for |X | = 100 and 1000, respectively). This is consistent with the time complexity described in Section 3.1.
From Figure 9 , we can also estimate the running time of SGLT for generating large-scale traces. Specifically, when |U| = 219793 and |X | = 1000 as in IST of FS, SGLT(T) (semantic clustering) would require about 4632 years (=8.4× (219793/100) 2 /(365 × 24)). Even if we use 1000 nodes of the ABCI (which has 1088 nodes [52] ) in parallel, SGLT(T) would require over four years. Thus SGLT cannot be applied to IST, and hence we compare Proposal with SGD in FS.
Experimental Results in FS
Utility and privacy. In FS, we used (k, ε)-PD as a privacy measure, and set k = 10 and ε = 1. We confirmed that about 60% to 70% of the synthetic traces passed the PDtest, and the utility was hardly affected by introducing the PD-test (see Appendix E for details). In Proposal, we set α = 200 (as in Figures 8 and 9 ). In SGD, we set γ = 0 for the following two reasons: (1) the re-identification rate is high for γ ≥ 1 in Figure 7 due to the uniqueness of location data [19] ; (2) the event in the first time slot is missing for many users in FS, and cannot be copied. Note that SGD with γ = 0 always passes the PD test, since it generates synthetic traces independently of the input data record [10] . We evaluated all of the utility measures for Proposal and SGD. Figure 10 shows the results. For TP-TV and TP-TV-Top50, Proposal performs worse than SGD in IST and JK, and as well as SGD in the other cities. This is because SGD uses the transition matrix common to all users, and the number of elements in the matrix does not depend on |U|. Consequently, SGD can preserve the population distribution effectively, especially when |U| is large (as in IST and JK).
However, for TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y, Proposal outperforms SGD, especially in JK, NYC, KL, and SP. This is because there are many missing events in FS, and the number of transitions in the training traces is small in JK, NYC, KL, and SP (as described in Section 4.1). Note that the population distribution consists of |X | values, whereas the transition matrix consists of |X | × |X | values. Since the number of latter values is much larger, it is much harder to accurately estimate the transition matrix itself.
A crucial difference between Proposal and SGD lies at the fact that Proposal models the user/cluster-specific mo- bility features, while SGD (γ = 0) does not. This causes the results of VF-TV and CP-TV in Figure 10 . Specifically, for VF-TV, SGD performs almost the same as Uniform, whereas Proposal significantly outperforms SGD. For CP-TV, Proposal also significantly outperforms SGD. To explain this in more detail, we performed the following analysis.
Analysis on user/cluster-specific features. First, we show in Figure 11 the distributions of visit-fractions for four POI categories in NYC (Testing represents the distribution of testing traces). It can be seen that the distribution of SGD concentrates at the visit-fraction of 1/24 (i.e., 0 to 0.042). This is because SGD (γ = 0) uses the transition matrix and visit-probability vector common to all users, and synthesizes traces independently of input training traces. Consequently, all users spend almost the same amount of time on each POI category. On the other hand, Proposal models the user-specific mobility feature via two tensors, and generates traces based on the mobility feature of the input training trace. As a result, the distribution of Proposal is similar to that of Testing, and reflects the fact that , whose values or frequencies from 10:00 to 12:00 are the highest. We also show the top 20 POIs in the map by circles. Red circles in (i) (resp. (ii)) represent outdoors/malls (resp. universities). Figure 11 also shows that the distributions in Proposal are useful for semantic annotation of POIs [20, 75] . Next, we visualize in Figure 12 the columns of factor matrices B and D and training/synthetic traces for two clusters. As with PF, the training users in each cluster exhibit a similar behavior; e.g., the users in (i) enjoy great outdoors and shopping at mall, whereas the users in (ii) go to universities. Note that users and POIs in each cluster are semantically similar; e.g., people who enjoy great outdoors also enjoy shopping at mall; many users in (ii) would be students, faculty, or staff. The activity time is also different between the two clusters. For example, we confirmed that many training users in (i) enjoy great outdoors and shopping from morning until night, whereas most training users in (ii) are not in the universities at night. Proposal models such a behavior via factor matrices, and synthesizes traces preserving the behavior. This explains the low values of CP-TV in Proposal. We emphasize that this aspect is useful for various geo-data analysis; e.g., modeling human location patterns, semantic annotation of POIs.
Note that some utility values of both Proposal and SGD might be improved by estimating missing events in training traces [64, 47] . However, VF-TV and CP-TV of SGD (γ = 0) cannot be improved even by estimating missing events, as it does not model the user/cluster-specific features. Scalability. We measured the running time in FS. Figure 13 shows that SGD is much faster than Proposal; e.g., in IST, Proposal requires about one day to synthesize traces, whereas SGD requires less than two minutes. The reason for this lies in the simplicity of SGD; i.e., SGD trains a transition matrix for each time slot via maximum likelihood estimation, and then synthesizes traces using the transition matrix. However, SGD (γ = 0) does not generate user/cluster-specific traces. To generate such traces, Proposal is necessary.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed PPMTF to synthesize largescale location traces. We comprehensively showed that the proposed method provides high utility with regard to various geo-data analysis ((a)-(d)), high privacy, and high scalability, and makes large-scale traces generation practical. ). R Tuple of two tensors (R = (R I , R II )).
Factor matrix in the "User" mode. B
Factor matrix in the "Location" mode. Indicator function that takes 0 if r † n,i,j is missing, and takes 1 otherwise.
B. TIME COMPLEXITY
Now we describe the time complexity of the proposed method described in Section 3 in detail. We assume that we generate a synthetic trace from each training trace sn ∈ S (i.e., |U| synthetic traces in total) and perform the PD test for each synthetic trace. We also assume that λ I , ρ I , λ II , ρ II , z, and |U * | are constants (note that typically λ I , ρ I |X | × |X |, λ II , ρ II |X | × |L|, and z min(|U |, |X |), as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3; a small value of |U * | is also used for a fast PD test, as described in Section 3.5).
In the step (i), we simply count the number of transitions and the number of visits from a training trace set S. Thus, the computation time of this step is very small, compared to that of the remaining four steps.
In the step (ii), we first randomly sample ρ I and ρ II zero elements for each user in R I and R II , respectively. This can be done in O(|U|) time in total by using a sampling technique in [25] . Subsequently, we train the MTF parameters Θ via the Gibbs sampling. The computation time of the Gibbs sampling can be expressed as O(|U| + |X | + |L|).
In the steps (iii) and (iv), we generate synthetic traces via the MH algorithm. The step (iii) is dominated by computing the transition-probability matrices Q * n , Qn,1, · · · , Q n,|L| for each training trace sn, which takes O(|U||X | 2 |L|) time in total. The step (iv) requires O(|U||X ||L|) time.
In the step (v), assume that we use the faster version of Privacy Test 1 (described in Section 3.5). Then we compute the transition-probability matrices Q * m , Qm,1, · · · , Q m,|L| for each training trace sm ∈ S * , which takes O(|X | 2 |L|) time in total. Subsequently, we check whether k ≥ k for each training trace sn ∈ S, which takes O(|U||X ||L|) time in total.
In summary, the time complexity of the proposed method can be expressed as O(|U||X | 2 |L|).
C. DETAILS ON SGD
SGD [10] is a general synthetic generator for any kind of data, which works as follows: (i) Train the dependency structure (graph) between data attributes; (ii) Train conditional probabilities for each attribute given its parent attributes; (iii) Generate a synthetic data record from an input data record by copying the top γ ∈ Z ≥0 attributes from the input data record and generating the remaining attributes using the trained conditional probabilities. Note that the dependency structure and the conditional probabilities are common to all users.
We applied SGD to synthesizing location traces as follows. We regarded an event as an attribute, and a location trace of length |T | as a data record with |T | attributes. Then it would be natural to consider that the dependency structure is given by the time-dependent Markov chain model as in Proposal and SGLT, and the conditional probabilities are given by the transition matrix for each time slot. In other words, we do not need to train the dependency structure; i.e., we can skip (i).
We trained the transition matrix for each time slot (|L| × |X | × |X | elements in total) and the visit-probability vector for the first time instant (|X | elements in total) from the training traces via maximum likelihood estimation. Then we synthesized a trace from an input training trace by copying the first γ events and generating the remaining events using the transition matrix (when γ = 0, we generated a location at the first time instant using the visit-probability vector).
Note that we did not add the Laplacian noise to the transition matrices and the visit-probability vector (unlike [10] ), since we assume that the parameters of the generative model are kept secret or discarded, as in [9] (see Section 2.2).
D. EFFECT OF SHARING FACTOR MA-TRICES
The proposed method (Proposal) shares the factor matrices A and B between two tensors. Here we show the effect of sharing them. Specifically, we compare the proposed method with a method that independently factorizes each tensor; i.e., factorizes R I into factor matrices A I ∈ R |U |×z , B I ∈ R |X |×z , C I ∈ R |X |×z , and R II into factor matrices A II ∈ R |U |×z , B II ∈ R |X |×z , D II ∈ R |L|×z , respectively. We train these factor matrices via the Gibbs sampling, and then generate synthetic traces via the MH algorithm in the same way as Proposal. We denote this method by ITF (Independent Tensor Factorization).
We compare Proposal with ITF using the Foursquare dataset (FS). Here we selected Tokyo (TKY) as a city (we also evaluated the other cities and obtained similar results). We used the same parameters as in Section 4.2. Then we evaluated the reconstruction errors of R I and R II . Specifically, we evaluated the sum of the l1-loss (absolute error) between R I andR I . We first evaluated the sum of the l1loss for observed elements (i.e., positive elements or zero elements treated as 0s). Then we evaluated the sum of the l1-loss for unobserved elements (i.e., zero elements treated as missing). Note that the number of unobserved elements is very large. Specifically, let η I ∈ Z ≥0 be the total number of unobserved elements in R I . Then η I is close to |U|×|X |×|X | (= 47956 × 1000 × 1000), as R I is very sparse (note that λ I = 10 2 and ρ I = 10 3 , as described in Section 4.2). Thus, we randomly selected 1000 unobserved elements for each user and evaluated the sum of the l1-loss for the selected elements. Then we multiplied the l1-loss by η I 1000|U | to estimate the l1-loss for all of the unobserved elements. We evaluated the l1-loss for the observed and unobserved elements in R II in the same way. We also evaluated all of the utility measures in Section 4.3. Figure 14 shows the reconstruction errors in R I and R II . It can be seen that Proposal significantly outperforms ITF with regard to the reconstruction error of unobserved elements in R I . This is because R I (which contains 47956 × 1000 × 1000 elements) is much more sparse than R II (which contains 47956 × 1000 × 24 elements), and R II compensates for the sparseness of R I in Proposal by sharing A and B. This is consistent with the experimental results in [69] , where multiple tensor factorization works well especially when one of two tensors is extremely sparse. Figure 15 shows the utility of Proposal and ITF (here we do not run the PD test; even if we use the (10, 1)-PD test, the utility of Proposal is hardly changed, as shown in Section E). It can be seen that Proposal significantly outperforms ITF with regard to VF-TV and CP-TV. We consider this is because Proposal trains A and B, which model the similarity structure among users and locations, respectively, more accurately by sharing them between R I and R II . Consequently, Proposal generates user-specific (or cluster-specific) traces more effectively. In summary, Proposal addresses the sparseness of R I and achieves high utility by sharing factor matrices.
E. EFFECT OF K IN THE PD TEST
Here we analyze the effect of k in (k, ε)-PD on the performance of the proposed method (Proposal). Specifically, we changed k from 1 to 200 in the experiments using the Foursquare dataset (FS). We set the other parameters to the same values as in Section 4 (e.g., ε = 1, |U * | = 32000).
First, we evaluated the PD test pass rate, which is the proportion of synthetic traces that have passed the PD test to all synthetic traces. Figure 16 shows the results for six cities. It can be seen that the PD test pass rate decreases as increase in k. For example, the PD test pass rate is about 60% to 70% when k = 10 (as in Section 4), whereas it is about 20% to 40% when k = 100.
Next, we set k to k = 1, 10, 100, or 200, and evaluated all of the utility measures in Section 4.3. Figure 17 shows the results for IST, NYC, and TKY (we confirmed that the results of the other cities were similar to those of NYC and TKY). Note that when k = 1, all of the synthetic traces pass the PD test. In other words, Proposal with k = 1 is equivalent to Proposal without the PD test.
It can be seen that all of the utility measures are hardly affected by running the PD test with k = 10 in all of the cities. In NYC and TKY, VF-TV and CP-TV are significantly increased by increasing k from 10 to 200. However, in IST, all of the utility measures are not affected much even when k = 200. Note that when k = 200, the PD test pass rate of IST (17.9%) is lower than that of NYC (26.9%), as shown in Figure 16 . Nevertheless, Proposal significantly outperforms Uniform with regard to all of the utility measures in IST. This is because the number of users is very large in IST (|U| = 219793). Thus, even if the PD test pass rate is low, a large amount of synthetic traces still pass the test and preserve the statistical features of all users or each cluster.
In summary, Proposal achieves high utility and high privacy for various types of geo-data analysis, especially when the amount of the original location data is very large. 
F. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let ε ∈ R ≥0 be the value given by ε = α((λ I + ρ I )(r I max + κ) 2 + (λ II + ρ II )(r II max + κ) 2 ). (9) By (4), the logarithm of p(Θ|R) can be written as follows:
ln p(Θ|R) = ln p(R|Θ) + ln p(Θ) − ln p(R) (by Bayes' theorem)
Let G be a function that takes as input two tensors R and the MTF parameters Θ and outputs G(R, Θ) ∈ R as follows:
Note that ln α 2π and ln p(R) in (10) do not depend on Θ. Thus, by (11) , ln p(Θ|R) in (10) can be expressed as follows:
Then, Proposition 1 can be proved by using the fact that FP P M T F is the exponential mechanism [22] that uses −G(R, Θ) as a utility function. Specifically, let R be the tuple of two tensors that differ from R at most one user's elements; i.e., R and R are neighboring. We write R ∼ R to represent that R and R are neighboring. Let ∆G ∈ R be the sensitivity of G given by:
Note that in (11), I I n,i,j (resp. I II n,i,j ) takes 1 at most λ I + ρ I (resp. λ II + ρ II ) elements for each user, as described in Section 3.3. In addition, r I n,i,j ∈ [0, r I max ], r II n,i,j ∈ [0, r II max ], r I n,i,j ∈ [−κ, r I max + κ], andr II n,i,j ∈ [−κ, r II max + κ] for each n, i, j, as described in Section 3.5. Thus, by (9) , the sum of the first and second terms in (11) is less than (resp. more than) or equal to ε 2 in (resp. 0). Then, since the third term in (11) is the same for G(R, Θ) and G(R , Θ) in (13), ∆G can be bounded above by ε 2 : i.e., ∆G ≤ ε 2 . Finally, we show that the ratio between p(Θ = FP P M T F (R)) and p(Θ = FP P M T F (R ) is bounded above by e ε . Note that by (12) 
G. DETAILS ON THE GIBBS SAMPLING
We explain how to sample the hyper-parameters Ψ and the MTF parameters Θ using the Gibbs sampling in detail.
In the t-th iteration, we sample Ψ (t)
D , A (t) , B (t) , C (t) , and D (t) from the conditional distribution given the current values of the other variables. Specifically, based on the graphical model in Figure 4 , we sample each variable as follows:
Below we explain how to compute the sampling distribution for the hyper-parameters and MTF parameters in detail.
Sampling of the hyper-parameters. We explain the computation of the right-hand side of (14) in the Gibbs sampling. We omit the computation of (15), (16) , and (17), as they are computed in the same way as (14) ; i.e., (15) , (16) , and (17) can be computed by replacing A in (14) with B, C, and D, respectively. Below we omit the superscripts (t) and (t − 1). p(Ψ A |A) in (14) can be computed by using the fact that the Normal-Wishart distribution is a conjugate prior of the multivariate normal distribution [11] . Specifically, following [61] , we compute p(Ψ A |A) in (14) as follows:
where µ * 0 = β 0 µ 0 +|U |ā 
Thus we compute p(Ψ A |A) by (22) to (28) , and then sample Ψ A from p(Ψ A |A).
Sampling of the MTF parameters. Next we explain the computation of (18) and (20) . We omit the computation of (19) and (21), as they are computed in the same way as (18) and (20) , respectively; i.e., (19) and (21) 
where R I n and R II n are the n-th matrices in R I and R II , respectively. By Bayes' theorem and the graphical model in .
Note that p(R I n |an, B, C), p(R II n |an, B, D), and p(an|Ψ A ) are normal distributions (as described in Section 3.3), and p(R I n , R II n |B, C, D, Ψ A ) is a normalization constant so that the sum of p(an|R I n , R II n , B, C, D, Ψ A ) over all values of an is one. In addition, let bcij ∈ R z and bdij ∈ R z are shorthand for bi • cj and bi • dj, respectively, where • represents the Hadamard product. Then by (3),r I n,i,j andr II n,i,j can be expressed as:r I n,i,j = a n bcij andr II n,i,j = a n bdij, respectively.
Thus, p(an|R I n , R II n , B, C, D, Ψ A ) can be expressed as:
αI I n,i,j (a n bcij − r I n,i,j ) 2
αI II n,i,j (a n bdij − r II n,i,j ) 2
where d1 ∈ R is a normalization constant. To simplify (29) and (31), we use the following two facts. First, for any v ∈ R and any w ∈ R z , we obtain: v 2 = v(w −1 w)(w w −1 )v = ((vw −1 ) w)(w (vw −1 )) = (vw −1 ) (ww )(vw −1 )) (by associativity).
Thus, (a n bcij − r I n,i,j ) 2 =(an − r I n,i,j bc −1 ij ) (bcijbc ij )(an − r I n,i,j bc −1 ij ) and (a n bdij − r II n,i,j ) 2 =(an − r II n,i,j bd −1 ij ) (bdijbd ij )(an − r II n,i,j bd −1 ij ). Therefore, we obtain:
N (an|r I n,i,j bc −1 ij , (αI I n,i,j bcijbc ij ) −1 )
N (an|r II n,i,j bd −1 ij , (αI II n,i,j bdijbd ij ) −1 )
· N (an|µA, Λ −1 A ),
where d2 ∈ R is a normalization constant. Second, the product of two Gaussian densities is proportional to a Gaussian density [55] . Specifically, for any w ∈ R z , any m1, m2 ∈ R z , and any Λ1, Λ2 ∈ R z×z , we obtain:
N (w|m1, Λ −1 1 ) · N (w|m2, Λ −1 2 ) = d3N (w|mc, Λ −1 c ), (33) where d3 = N (m1|m2, Λ −1 1 + Λ −1 2 ) mc = (Λ1 + Λ2) −1 (Λ1m1 + Λ2m2) Λc = Λ1 + Λ2.
By (32) 
where Λ * A,n = Λ A + αI I n,i,j
Similarly, p(C|R I , A, B, Ψ C ) in (20) can be written as follows: 
where Λ * C,j = Λ C + αI I n,i,j
and abni is shorthand for an • bi. Thus we compute p(A|R, B, C, D, Ψ A ) and p(C|R I , A, B, Ψ C ) by (35) to (37) and (38) to (40) , respectively. Then we sample A and C from these distributions.
